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Abstract
We explore the eﬃcacy of price and quantity controls as environ-
mental policy instruments in a stochastic setting in which agents are
risk averse. We demonstrate that the assumption of risk aversion may
improve the performance of a tax relative to that of a system of trad-
able quotas, and that restricting quota trade may enhance eﬃciency
even though risk aversion in itself limits volumes of trade. The gov-
ernment may be able to improve the performance of a tradable quota
system by judicious choice of distribution and amount of initial quotas
and by trading pro-actively in the quota market.
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1 Introduction
It is a well know result that in ideal circumstances environmental goals can
be attained at minimum cost by market-based instruments such as taxes on
emissions of a pollutant or by issuing transferable emission permits. In partic-
ular, for tradable permits in such situations trade will occur until marginal
costs are equalised across parties and hence costs of pollution control are
minimised. In reality, various market imperfections may cause this result to
fail.1 The purpose of this paper is to study the consequences of a particular
type of market imperfection: we explore the eﬀects of uncertainty and risk-
aversion on the performance of market-based instruments for environmental
regulation.
Our starting point is the observation that when permits are traded in a
market, agents are exposed to risk whenever the permit price varies stochas-
tically. This can aﬀect their behaviour if they care about risk;2 in particular,
market participants will try to reduce their exposure to it. As we shall see,
the optimal response of agents to risk may depend on their market position.
For example, an agent who has to rely on the purchase of permits to cover
emissions may, by investing in abatement equipment, reduce his exposure to
the random variations in his costs of emissions. Conversely, a potential seller
of permits may want to invest less in abatement and hence use more permits
himself.
Given that risk aﬀects individual incentives, we would in general expect
that market outcomes will be influenced also. Furthermore, such eﬀects will
be diﬀerent in diﬀerent regulatory regimes. For example, when quotas are
tradable, changes in investment incentives under risk may be expected to
depend on the initial allocation of permits.3 It follows that the distribution
of permits at the outset will, in general, aﬀect market equilibrium. The
outcome may then be expected to be ineﬃcient, one indicator of that being
less trade than would be the case were agents risk neutral. Uncertainty and
risk aversion may therefore adversely aﬀect the performance of a tradable
quota regime relative to regulation by taxes, say. It is conceivable that in
1Also, Cole and Grossman (1999) argue that in many cases monitoring and enforcement
as well as other institutional and technological costs may cause command-and-control
regulation to be more eﬃcient than market based instruments.
2Even if agents are risk-neutral they may have an incentive, in an uncertain economic
environment, to delay irreversible investment decisions until a more favourable price for
quotas is observed. This is a topic that was treated by Chao and Wilson (1993), Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), Baldursson and von der Fehr (1998) and Zhao (2000). Saphores and Carr
(1999) and Xepapadeas (1999) also use the irreversible investment approach for studying
related issues.
3We use the terms ’quotas’ and ’permits’ interchangeably.
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such circumstances restricting trade may improve the cost eﬃciency of quota
regulation.
The observation that uncertainty and risk aversion may reduce trade is
particularly interesting when the practical experience with quota systems is
examined. While some systems, such as the US sulphur dioxide allowance
trading scheme, are regarded as successes, others have not been as successful.4
In particular, low trading levels in some of these programs are an indication
that potential gains from trade are not realised.5 There are several possible
explanations for lack of success in a market for a particular pollution per-
mit. All of these are based on market imperfections of one kind or another.
Among these are market power in permit and output markets, non-profit
maximising behaviour, and transaction costs. Stavins (1995) emphasises the
role of transaction costs and shows how they reduce trading levels and raise
abatement costs; furthermore, he also shows that the initial allocation of per-
mits can aﬀect equilibrium permit distribution and thus lead to an ineﬃcient
outcome.
In this paper we explore another form of transaction costs - namely the
risks involved in relying on market-based transactions - by focusing on how
risk aversion, in combination with uncertainty, can aﬀect decisions on in-
vestment in pollution abatement equipment. Our model is constructed to
capture the relevant aspects of a market in which agents must make invest-
ment decisions ahead of observing uncertain and dynamic evolution. The
model is written without an explicit time dimension, but implicitly there are
two time periods: an ex ante period before uncertainty is revealed and when
investment decisions in capital intensive abatement must be made, and an
ex post period after the observation of random events and when decisions on
abatement involving variable costs only must be made. In tradable quota
regimes decisions on quota transactions take place in the ex post period (in a
later section we extend the model to allow for ex ante quota trade also). Un-
certainty in our model can, in the most general specification, enter through
the number of firms, the amount of pollution or abatement costs. Uncertainty
can also be firm specific (idiosyncratic risk) or extraneous (aggregate risk).
Firms are assumed to be risk averse, they are infinitesimally small, take all
prices as given and consider their own actions and market aggregates only
when making decisions. There is an executive authority who sets tax rates,
allocates quotas and can enter the quota market to influence the aggregate
4See Stavins (1999) for a review and evaluation of the experience with market-based
instruments.
5Clearly, a tradable permit system can also fail in attaining its primary purpose - that of
achieving a given environmental target - for example due to non-compliance and imperfect
monitoring (Montero, 1999), but in this paper we focus on the cost eﬃciency aspect.
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amount of emissions if it chooses.
This simple model gives surprisingly rich results.6 First, we consider a
tax regime with a fixed linear tax, and, as may be expected considering
Weitzman’s seminal paper on ’Prices vs. quantities’ (1974), such regulation
transfers risk (stemming from the regulation of pollution) from the firms to
society at large, since the marginal cost of each firm becomes fixed but aggre-
gate emissions become uncertain. Cost eﬃciency is achieved since marginal
costs are equalised across firms and periods.
We then turn to the study of a quota regime when risk is purely extra-
neous to firms. We establish the result that for a single firm investment in
abatement equipment depends on its initial allocation of quotas and there-
fore marginal abatement costs will, in general, not be equalised across firms
nor time periods (the latter in an expectational sense). In particular, firms
that are allocated no quotas will over-invest, in the sense that marginal in-
vestment costs are driven up to a level higher than the expected quota price,
in order to reduce the risk they are subjected to through the quota market.
Conversely, firms that receive all their quotas gratis will under-invest. Costs
are therefore minimised neither at the firm level nor across firms. In the
special case of constant absolute risk aversion it is possible to establish a
monotone relationship between allocated quota and investment. In general,
we can show that in a grandfathering regime, in which firms are either given
quotas to cover all their emissions (old firms) or none at all (new firms), the
volume of trade between firms is less when firms are risk averse than when
they are risk neutral.
Since the risk of the market for pollution permits can have such negative
eﬀects, it is of interest to consider elimination of firms’ exposure to risk by
removing the possibility of trade in quotas. Then firms are not faced with
uncertainty and will equalise their marginal costs across time periods. In
general, marginal costs will, however, not be equalised across firms unless
investment costs are linear. Hence, in this special case, restricting quota
trade improves cost eﬃciency.
We also consider the case of risk at the firm level. We assume risk is
generated by uncertain emissions of pollutant, but the analysis is basically
identical in the case of uncertain abatement costs. Furthermore, by assuming
firms are symmetric and risk averse, we can establish a similar result as when
risk is extraneous, viz. that there is ineﬃcient over-investment in equilibrium
which may be mitigated by increasing the initial amount of quotas. The
authority can achieve the desired aggregate emissions by ex post purchases
6The analytical diﬃculties encountered are also surprising - we do not get as far as we
would like!
4
in the quota market. Since the uncertainty in this case is at the firm level,
restricting quota trade does not shield firms from risk; thus in this case
investment is ’too high’ once again.
Forward markets for pollution permits are rare.7 However, since forward
trading is a means of controlling risk it is of interest to study the eﬀects of
forward markets in our model. We do this in the framework of firm level
risk described in the previous paragraph and show that a well-functioning
forward market for pollution permits would counteract, but not eliminate,
the eﬀects of uncertainty and risk aversion.
In our analysis we generally assume firms are equally risk averse. How-
ever, one can argue that firms may have diﬀerent attitudes towards risk.
For example larger firms may have better access to capital markets and be
more diversified, and consequently less risk averse, than smaller firms. We
briefly consider a case where there are two types of firms: risk averse and risk
neutral. We show that allowing for trade between firms with these diﬀerent
characteristics has ambiguous eﬀects on the expected costs of reducing emis-
sions. However, cost eﬃciency may be enhanced by allocating a larger share
of quotas to risk averse firms than to risk neutral ones and then allowing for
trade.
2 Modelling framework
Firms are identical, infinitesimally small and are price takers in all markets.
The mass of firms is M and firms are indexed by m. Firm m produces
ρ(m) units of the pollutant (before any cleaning activities) and aggregate
production of the pollutant is given by
R =
Z M
0
ρ(m)dm. (1)
Firms can reduce their emissions by investing in a given technology. The
cost of reducing emissions by k equals f(k). We assume that f(0) = 0, that f
is smooth, increasing and convex and (to rule out corner solutions) that the
cost of investment tends to infinity as k ↑ k∞. If k(m) denotes the investment
7A well functioning and liquid spot market is a prerequisite for a successful market in
corresponding forward contracts (Radetzki, 1990). Risk aversion provides an incentive for
forward trading in itself, yet, to the extent that it is to blame for thin spot markets, it is
also an indirect cause of missing forward markets.
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by firm m, m ∈ [0,M ], aggregate investment and investment costs equal
K =
Z M
0
k(m)dm, (2)
F =
Z M
0
f(k(m))dm. (3)
Firms can also reduce their emissions by application of a technology in-
volving variable costs only. The abatement cost c is smooth, increasing and
convex with c(0) = 0 and c0 (a) ↑ ∞ as a ↑ a∞, where P {ρ (m) ≥ a∞ + k∞} =
1 for allm (so, complete elimination of emissions is ruled out by assumption).
If a(m) denotes the abatement undertaken with the variable cost technology
by firm m, m ∈ [0, M ], aggregate abatement and abatement costs equal
A =
Z M
0
a(m)dm, (4)
C =
Z M
0
c(a(m))dm. (5)
Emissions at firm m and aggregate emissions are given, respectively, by
e(m) = ρ(m)− a(m)− k(m), (6)
E =
Z M
0
e(m)dm = R−A−K. (7)
In this environment we shall consider three sources of risk, related to the
mass of firms (M), production of the pollutant (ρ) and abatement costs (c),
respectively. We assume that uncertainty is revealed only after investment
in the k-technology has been made. However, firms can adjust their abate-
ment with the a-technology immediately upon observing the realisation of
stochastic parameters.
Due to the up-front investment cost and unspecified market imperfections,
firms are risk-averse and maximise expected utility of profits. The concave
utility function is denoted by U . Prior to any measures to control pollution
firms have an exogenous rate of profit, π.8
We consider two types of policies to reduce pollution: a fixed, linear tax t
imposed on a unit of pollutant emitted and a quota, i.e., a limit on aggregate
8Profits may depend on the number of firms (M) and the production of the pollutant
(ρ). Since we are assuming that the number of firms is exogenous (in eﬀect ignoring how
environmental policies may aﬀect firms’ entry and exit decisions), the essential assump-
tion is that in the relevant range gross profits always exceed the sum of investment and
abatement costs.
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emissions. The emission limit E may be attained by tradable or non-tradable
pollution quotas that are distributed in some way initially. The amount of
quotas distributed to firm m is denoted by q(m) and the aggregate amount
of distributed quotas is
Q =
Z M
0
q(m)dm. (8)
Note that when quotas are tradable Q need not be equal to E. As will become
clear, the policy maker can achieve diﬀerent outcomes by a judicious, initial
choice of quotas, not only at the aggregate level, but also by distributing them
in diﬀerent ways to firms. To achieve the emission target E with Q 6= E the
policy maker must of course act in the ex post quota market to purchase/sell
the diﬀerence Q− E.
The social damage due to aggregate emissions is given by a convex func-
tionD and total expected social cost is given by the expected value of damage
and cost of abatement:
S = E {D(R−K − A) + C + F} . (9)
3 The tax regime
In this section we assume pollution is regulated by a fixed linear tax, t,
on emissions. Recall that firms must invest ex ante, i.e., before observing
the realisation of stochastic variables. Decisions on abatement, on the other
hand, are made ex post when firms have observed all relevant variables and do
not face any uncertainty. The optimisation problem of the firm can therefore
be solved in two steps, by first determining the optimal level of abatement,
given investment and then, in the second step, one can go on to solve for the
right amount of investment.
Given a level of investment k, a firm will minimise the sum of abatement
cost and tax payments, c(a) + t[ρ − a − k], and hence select its level of
abatement such that
c0(at) = t. (10)
At the investment stage firms maximise expected utility of profits, where
profits are given by
Πt = π − c
¡
at
¢
− f (k)− t
£
ρ− at − k
¤
. (11)
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The first-order condition for this problem is
E
©
U 0
¡
Πt
¢ £
t− f
¡
kt
¢¤ª
= 0. (12)
Since the marginal profitability of investment, t− f 0 (kt), is deterministic
by assumption a firm will choose kt so as to equate marginal investment cost
to the tax rate; that is,
f 0
¡
kt
¢
= 0. (13)
Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 When emissions are regulated by a tax, cost eﬃciency in
emission reductions is achieved; in particular, at (m) ≡ at and kt (m) = kt
for all m and c0 (at) ≡ f 0 (kt) = t.
The proposition implies that internal cost eﬃciency is attained, since
marginal costs are equalised across technologies at individual firms. Further-
more, external cost eﬃciency is achieved also, since marginal costs are the
same at all firms. The reason for both of these results is that the opportu-
nity cost of emissions is determined by the fixed tax. Note, however, that
firms are still subject to risk since emissions and profits are uncertain given
the investment and abatement choices at and kt, respectively. The particular
assumptions about sources of uncertainty are not crucial for the above result.
It should be noted also that cost eﬃciency of the tax in the presence
of risk aversion does not guarantee social optimality. In particular, even if
the tax is set optimally aggregate emissions will vary stochastically which
may make regulation by taxes unattractive when social damage is taken into
account, cf. Weitzman (1974).
4 Quota regimes: pure extraneous risk
In this section we assume that only the mass of firmsM is stochastic. For sim-
plicity the production of the pollutant is normalised to unity, i.e., ρ (m) ≡ 1
for all m. This set up is meant to capture (in an admittedly crude manner)
the dynamic evolution of industries - with entry and exit of firms - to which it
may be diﬃcult to fully adjust environmental policies. In practice there may
be uncertainty also about production of the pollutant, abatement technolo-
gies et cetera. As we shall see below, by ignoring stochasticity ’intrinsic’ to
firms’ operations we are able to push to the extreme the diﬀerences between
how price and quantity controls aﬀect firms’ exposure to risk. In particu-
lar, the assumption that uncertainty originates from the number of polluters
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implies that firms will be exposed to risk through the price of quotas only;
that is, risk is entirely extraneous, transmitted through market prices. With
more general assumptions about sources of uncertainty firms may face risk
independently of the choice of policy instrument. We return to the latter
possibility in the next section.
4.1 Tradable quotas
In the quota regime aggregate emissions are capped at E. To ensure a non-
vacuous problem we assume that9
Pr
©
M ≥ E
ª
> 0. (14)
When quotas are tradable, a market for them will arise. Denote the market
price of a unit of emissions by p. Then, given its investment level, k, a
firm will minimise its costs, c(a) + p[1 − a − k], and abatement, aq, will be
determined so that marginal abatement cost equals the opportunity cost of
emissions, i.e.,
c0(aq) = p, (15)
for all firms. Suppose aggregate investment is Kq. Then, assuming the
emission cap is binding, we have
Aq =M − E − Kq, (16)
and therefore, since Aq = M aq,
p = c0(
M −E − Kq
M
). (17)
Now, since M is stochastic, the price of quotas faced ex ante by firms is
stochastic and therefore their risk aversion comes into play.
Suppose a firm has been allocated a quota to emit q units of pollutant. For
a given realisation of the number of firms M , it will abate an amount aq =£
M −E − Kq
¤
/ M . If the firm decides to invest k, it will therefore have to
buy (resp. sell) 1− aq − k− q quotas in the marketplace. Consequently, the
firm will choose k so as to maximise
E {U (π − c(aq)− f(k)− p [1− aq − k − q])} . (18)
9Recall that ρ = 1 for all firms.
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The first-order condition for this problem is given by
E {U 0 (Πq) [p− f 0(kq)]} = 0, (19)
where
Πq = π − c(aq)− f(kq)− p [1− aq − kq − q] (20)
is the profit of the firm given kq (net of any costs of obtaining the initial
quota allocation q).
The above condition determine the investment at each firm as well as
aggregate investment, Kq, and thus market equilibrium is now completely
determined. The social cost of emissions is given by
Sq = D(E) + E
½
Mc(
M −E − Kq
M
) + F q
¾
. (21)
where F q is the aggregate cost of investment. By inspection of (19), we
immediately have:
Proposition 2 Assume firms are risk averse. Then, for a given emission
limit E, the investment undertaken by any particular firm depends on its
initial allocation of quotas.
Note that this result implies that, for an arbitrary allocation of quotas,
investment costs will in general not be minimised across firms:
Corollary 3 When quotas must be allocated before all polluters have been
identified, risk neutrality of polluters is a necessary condition for a system of
tradable quotas to minimise the costs of reducing emissions.
Having established the dependence of investment on the initial quota
allocation we next want to consider the particular nature of this relationship.
Intuitively, one might perhaps expect a fairly straightforward relationship
between the initial quota allocation and investment in abatement equipment.
In particular, a firm that initially has been given very few quotas, and hence
needs to cover its emissions by purchasing quotas in the marketplace, reduces
its exposure to risk by over-investing in abatement equipment. Correspond-
ingly, a firm with a suﬃciently large initial quota holding that will always
be selling quotas might be expected to under-invest. More generally, one
would expect a negative relationship between initial quota allocation and
investment in abatement equipment.
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As it turns out, this is not so straightforward. In particular, there is a
non-trivial relationship between firm profits and the stochastic quota price.
Typically, a firm will be selling quotas when the price is high and buying when
the price is low. Consequently, profits will tend to be decreasing in the quota
price at low levels of the price but increasing in the price at high levels. It is
only when a firm is always either a seller or a buyer (e.g. if it either receives
full quota or none) that this relationship is monotone. In these extreme
cases we can indeed establish unambiguous results. In the intermediate case,
however, we have not been able to prove a general result. As we shall see
below, by imposing further restrictions on the utility function a monotone
relationship between quota allocation and investment can nevertheless be
established.
Lemma 4 For any distribution of p,
f 0(kq) ≥ Ep for q = 0 (22)
f 0(kq) ≤ Ep for q = 1
and, furthermore, there exists a number q0, 0 ≤ q0 ≤ 1 such that
f 0 (kq) = Ep for q = q0. (23)
Proof. Note that, by the application of the Envelope Theorem, we get
dΠq
dp
= − [1− aq − kq] + q. (24)
Consider the case in which q = 0. Then Πq is a non-increasing function of p
by (24). Therefore,
0 = E {U 0(Πq) [p− f 0]}
≥ E
©
1{p<f 0}U 0(Πqp=f 0) [p− f 0]
ª
+ E
©
1{p≥f 0}U 0(Πqp=f 0) [p− f 0]
ª
(25)
= U 0(Πqp=f 0) [Ep− f 0]
Since U 0 > 0, it follows that f 0 ≤ Ep. The second inequality of (22) follows
from an analogous argument. The equality (23) follows from (22) and the
continuity of f 0 and of k as a function of q.
Remark 1 In the absence of corner solutions, i.e. if Pr {0 < aq + kq < 1} >
0, the inequalities in (22) hold strictly and in that case 0 < q0 < 1.
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Whether or not firms invest beyond the level at which marginal cost of invest-
ment equals the (expected) marginal cost of emissions depends on the amount
of allocated quotas. If a firm has not been allocated an emission quota (i.e.,
q = 0), and we are at an interior equilibrium (so that e = 1− a− k > 0 for
some realisations of p), then f 0(k) > Ep = Ec0; that is, the firm over-invests
relative to the cost minimising solution. Conversely, if the allocated emission
quota is large enough the firm under-invests.
Proposition 5 There exists a number q∗, 0 < q∗ < 1, such that if, initially,
each firm is allocated a quota of q∗, f 0 (kq) = Ec0 (aq) for q = q∗.
Proof. Consider the case in which all firms receive identical quotas q and
define the function
g (q) = f 0 (kq)− Ec0 (aq) . (26)
By Lemma 1, with p = c0 (aq), it follows that
g (0) > 0 > g (1) . (27)
The existence of q∗ follows from the continuity of g.
Note that when all firms receive the same positive quota the total quota is
stochastic. The authority must therefore buy or sell quotas in the secondary
market to achieve the desired emissions E.
From the above analysis a monotone negative relationship between the
amount of quota allocated to a firm and its investment might have been
expected. However, from the first order condition (19) and application of the
Envelope Theorem we get
dkq
dq
=
E {U 00 (Πq) p [p− f 0 (kq)]}
E
©
U 00 (Πq) [p− f 0 (kq)]2 − U 0 (Πq) f 00 (kq)
ª . (28)
Clearly, in the above expression the denominator is negative while the numer-
ator can take on both positive and negative values in general. Nevertheless,
by making specific assumptions on the utility function we can establish that
the numerator is negative and hence investment is reduced by a larger quota
allocation.
Let
rA(Π) = −
U 00(Π)
U 0(Π) (29)
be the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.
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Proposition 6 Assume rA : R→ R is constant. Then, for all q ≥ 0,
−1 < dk
dq
< 0. (30)
Proof. The second-order condition for optimal investment corresponding to
(19) may be written
∆ , E
n
U 00 (Πq) [p− f 0(kq)]2 − U 0(Πq)f 00(kq)
o
< 0. (31)
Using (19), we have the following comparative statics result:
dkq
dq
=
E {U 00(Πq)p [p− f 0(kq)]}
−∆ . (32)
Observe that
E {−U 00 [p− f 0] f 0} = E {rAU 0 [p− f 0] f 0} (33)
= rAE {U 0 [p− f 0] f 0}
= 0
where the last equality follows from the first-order condition (19). Hence, by
(32),
dk
dq
=
E
©
U 00(Π) [p− f 0(k)]2
ª
−∆
which, along with (31), implies (30).
Combined, Propositions 5 and 6 imply that firms with large initial quota
holdings will invest less - and hence emit more - than firms with smaller
quotas. In general, if k is decreasing in q then, given an initial allocation of
quotas and the corresponding equilibrium, a reallocation of quotas from firms
with small quota holdings to firms with large quota holdings - i.e., towards a
more uneven allocation - would lead to greater diﬀerences in investment. In
particular, a marginal reallocation that increases quota holdings of firms that
under-invest in the initial equilibrium at the expense of those who initially
over-invest will result in increased divergence between marginal investment
costs across firms.
Proposition 7 Assume quotas are distributed such that firms are either
given quotas of q ≥ 1 or none at all. Then in equilibrium the total vol-
ume of trade between firms is less when firms are risk averse than when they
are risk neutral.
13
Proof. Observe that, when firms are risk neutral, the price of quotas is
positive with non-zero probability (since Pr
©
M ≥ E
ª
). Therefore, in equi-
librium, investment, which is identical at all firms, will be positive and there
will be trade in quotas. By Lemma 4 firms given quotas of q ≥ 1 will invest
less when risk averse than they would when risk neutral, and, conversely,
firms given zero quotas will invest more.
Consider the case in which, due to risk aversion, aggregate investment is
higher and, as a consequence, aggregate abatement is lower. Since all firms
abate equally, abatement is lower at all firms. It follows that the firms with
quotas use more of them for their own production and sell fewer. In the
opposite case, in which aggregate investment is lower and, hence, abatement
is higher, firms with no quotas will emit less and therefore buy fewer quotas.
Remark 2 Proposition 7 may rephrased by stating that in a grandfathering
regime risk aversion reduces trade.
We conjecture that Proposition 7 hints at a more general result: for any
initial allocation of quotas, volumes of trade will be smaller the more risk
averse firms are. To prove such a result one would need to show that those
selling under risk neutrality under-invest when risk averse and vice versa for
those buying. Due to the diﬃculty of establishing a monotone relationship
between quota holdings and investment, and the dependence of the quota
price on abatement decisions, we have not been able to get further towards
demonstrating such a general result. What we can say, however, is that when
firms are suﬃciently risk averse trade will be limited; in particular, infinitely
risk averse firms would not trade at all.
4.2 Non-tradable quotas
In the case when quotas are non-tradable, firms are not faced with uncer-
tainty. Subject to the allocated quota, each firm will choose its investment
and abatement levels so as to minimise total economic costs; that is a firm
will solve the minimisation problem
min
a,k
{f(k) + c(a) : 1− a− k ≤ q} . (34)
The first-order condition for this problem (given that the constraint binds)
is
c0(1− k − q) = f 0(k). (35)
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A system of non-tradable quotas therefore leads to internal cost eﬃciency
(i.e., at the firm level) irrespective of the quota allocation. Clearly, for an
arbitrary quota allocation, in general there will not be external cost eﬃciency;
that is, marginal costs will not be equalised across firms. Therefore, aggregate
costs of reducing emissions will not be minimised. However, in the case in
which the k-technology exhibits constant returns to scale, marginal costs will,
in fact, be equalised across firms as well:
Proposition 8 When there is uncertainty about the number of polluters only
and marginal investment costs are constant, a system of non-tradable quotas
minimises the aggregate cost of reducing emissions.
In the constant marginal cost case, limiting tradability of quotas there-
fore enhances eﬃciency by eliminating firms’ exposure to risk. More gener-
ally, there is a trade-oﬀ between internal and external cost eﬃciency. Non-
tradability leads to internal cost eﬃciency while tradability allows for equal-
isation of marginal abatement (but not investment) costs across firms. De-
pending on the initial allocation of quotas, either eﬀect may dominate.
5 Quota regimes: firm level risk
In this section we consider risk that originates at the firm level. For simplicity
we restrict attention to the case in which the production of the pollutant is
stochastic. Results are basically identical in the case in which risk originates
from the costs of abatement.
Fix the mass of firms at 1 and assume that the production of the pollu-
tant is stochastic and is observed only after investment in the k-technology
has been made. Firms can adjust their abatement with the a-technology
immediately upon observing {ρ (m) : 0 ≤ m ≤ 1}.
5.1 Tradable quotas
In a tradable quota regime all firms will abate the same amount of pollutant
aq, where c0(aq) = p. Since the mass of firms is normalised to 1, we have
aq = Aq = R −E −Kq, (36)
and hence the price of quotas is determined by
p = c0(R− E −Kq). (37)
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At investment stage the decision problem faced by a firm is to choose k
so as to maximise
E {U (π − c(aq)− f(k)− p [ρ− aq − k − q])} . (38)
Unlike in the previous section the firm therefore faces two kinds of risk, viz.
market risk, via aggregate emissions R, and idiosyncratic risk via its own
emissions ρ. The first-order condition may be written
E {U 0 (π − c(aq)− f(kq)− p [ρ− aq − kq − q]) [p− f 0(kq)]} = 0. (39)
To be able to say something about the level of investment in this case
we must make some assumptions regarding the form of uncertainty. Let us
assume that at firm m, production of the pollutant is given by
ρ (m) = bR + ε (m) , (40)
where {ε (m) ; 0 ≤ m ≤ 1}is a collection of i.i.d. random variables with mean
zero and finite variance independent of bR, which is a random variable also.10
Then aggregate pollution production is given by R = bR. In what follows we
identify bR with R and drop the hat of the former random variable. Thus
pollution production at each firm is composed of an aggregate variable and
an idiosyncratic shock. We are able to establish the parallel of Proposition
5 under a simple condition on the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock in
(40):
Proposition 9 Assume U is strictly concave and production of the pollutant
is stochastic and given by (40). Furthermore assume that
Pr {ε (m) ≥ −L} = 1, where L = inf
x≥0
c0 (x)
c00 (x)
. (41)
If quotas are tradable and distributed such that all firms are initially allocated
an identical amount q, then allocating the entire emission target E leads to
ineﬃcient over-investment in equilibrium, i.e. f 0 > Ep. Furthermore, there
exists a quota q∗ < E, such that if each firm is initially allocated q∗, then
f 0 (kq) = Ec0 (aq) for q = q∗.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the proposition hold and that all firms
are allocated the same quota, i.e., q (m) = q for all m. Further, the initial
10ε should be thought of as a white noise process (Karlin and Taylor, 1981, p 342).
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allocation is such that Q = E, which implies q = E and ρ− aq − k − q = ε.
At the symmetric equilibrium, the first-order condition (39) implies
E
©
U 0
¡
π − c
¡
R− E − kq
¢
− f (kq)− pε
¢
[p− f 0 (kq)]
ª
= 0, (42)
where p = c0
¡
R− E − kq
¢
. Note that for each fixed value of ε > −L we have
c0 (x) + εc00 (x) < 0 for all x ≥ 0, (43)
and hence gε (R) = U 0
¡
π − c
¡
R− E − kq
¢
− f (kq)− pε
¢
is increasing in R
for each such ε. Note also that for a fixed R, gε (R) is increasing in ε. Now
let
A =
©
c0
¡
R−E − kq
¢
− f 0 (kq) > 0
ª
= {p− f 0 (kq) > 0} , (44)
and denote the value of R such that c0
¡
R −E − kq
¢
− f 0 (kq) = 0 by R0.
From (42) we get
0 = E {E {1Agε (R) [p− f 0] |ε}+ E {1ACgε (R) [p− f 0] |ε}}
> E {E {1Agε (R0) [p− f 0] |ε}+ E {1ACgε (R0) [p− f 0] |ε}} (45)
= E {E {gε (R0) [p− f 0] |ε}} ≥ g−L (R0)E {p− f 0} .
Consequently, as long as firms are risk averse there is always ineﬃcient over-
investment at the symmetric equilibrium, i.e. f 0 > Ec0. The existence of q∗
is shown exactly as in Proposition 5.
The condition (41) on the distribution of e is of course restrictive and in
certain cases L may be equal to zero. In that case (41) amounts to assuming
that ε (m) = 0 and that all firms produce the same amount, R, of pollutant.
However, from the argument in the proof of Proposition 9 it seems likely that
the condition is in fact overly restrictive and that the results could lend itself
to generalisation.
5.2 Forward trading
It is natural to ask whether the introduction of forward markets would change
the overinvestment result in Proposition 9. Suppose we are in the same
setting as in Section 5.1; that is, we fix the mass of firms at 1 and assume
that pollution production at each firm is composed of an aggregate variable
R and an idiosyncratic shock ε (m) as in (40). In addition to investing and
abating as before, firms can trade quotas in a forward market at the same
time they invest (i.e., before uncertainty is revealed). We denote the quantity
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of quotas contracted in the forward market by qf and the forward price by pf .
Abatement aq and the ex post quota price p are determined by (36) and (37)
as before and the profit of a firm, after investment, abatement and forward
trades is given by
Πf = π − c (aq)− f (k)− p
£
ρ− aq − k − q − qf
¤
− pfqf . (46)
The first order conditions for maximal expected utility are,
∂
∂kE
©
U
¡
Πf
¢ª
= E
©
U 0
¡
Πf
¢ £
p− f 0
¡
kf
¢¤ª
= 0, (47)
∂
∂qfE
©
U
¡
Πf
¢ª
= E
©
U 0
¡
Πf
¢ £
p− pf
¤ª
= 0, (48)
which immediately implies that the forward price must equal the marginal
cost of investment
f 0
¡
kf
¢
≡ pf . (49)
As a consequence we see that investment must be the same at all firms,
regardless of the amount of quotas q allocated to the firm at the outset.
Consider the symmetric grandfathering case in which all firms are allo-
cated the same quota E. Since all firms are the same, it is clear that, in
equilibrium, there will be no forward trading. There will, however, exist an
equilibrium forward price pf∗.11 Note that in this case (46) reduces to
Πf = π − c (aq)− f (k)− p [ρ− aq − k − q] . (50)
Comparing E
©
U
¡
Πf
¢ª
in the symmetric case to (38) it is clear that Propo-
sition 9 carries through in this case as well and if (41) is satisfied we have
f 0 (k) > Ep∗ (51)
for all firms in equilibrium. Thus, there is ineﬃcient overinvestment as before
and furthermore by (49) we have
pf∗ > Ep∗; (52)
that is, the equilibrium forward price is strictly larger than the expected spot
price of quotas.
It is clearly diﬃcult to obtain results for the general case in which firms
are allocated diﬀerent quotas. However, it is clear that for allocations that
are non-symmetric, but are suﬃciently close to the symmetric allocation,
there would be trade in the forward market, firms would use a mixture of
investment, forward trading and abatement to meet their obligations and the
inequality (52) would continue to hold.
11At a forward price higher than the equilibrium price all firms would want to sell their
quotas in the forward market; at a lower price all would want to buy.
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5.3 Non-tradable quotas
In the case when quotas are non-tradable, a firm will choose k so as to
maximize
E {U (π − f(k)− c(ρ− k − q))} . (53)
The first-order condition for this problem is given by
E {U 0 (π − c (ρ− q − kn)− f (kn)) [c0 (ρ− q − kn)− f 0 (kn)]} = 0. (54)
By concavity of the utility function, it is immediate that firms do not
minimise expected total cost of investment and abatement; in particular:
Proposition 10 When there is uncertainty about the amount of the pollu-
tant and quotas are non-tradable, investment cost exceeds expected abatement
cost at the margin, i.e. f 0 (kn) > E {c0 (an)}.
Clearly, comparing conditions (39) and (54), the equilibrium outcome
does depend on whether or not quotas are tradable. In particular, when quo-
tas are not tradable costs of abiding by regulations depend on idiosyncratic
shocks only, while when quotas are tradable these costs depend also on aggre-
gate uncertainty at the market level. Unless shocks are perfectly correlated,
the market allows for an opportunity for diversification that tends to reduce
the risk agents face.
To see this, consider again the case in which firms are allocated symmetric
quotas and shocks are of the form given in (40). Suppose the common term
R is completely deterministic. Then there is no uncertainty in the aggregate
and so the quota market will clear at the same price in all contingencies.
Consequently, firms face a fixed opportunity cost of investment and hence all
firms will invest so as to equate marginal investment cost to the quota price.
Therefore, while non-tradability would lead to ineﬃcient over-investment,
tradability would, in this case, guarantee overall cost eﬃciency.
Note the contrast between this result and the results referred to in Sec-
tion 4.2. In that case, since uncertainty was purely extraneous, transmitted
through market prices, opening the quota market for trade subjects agents to
risk that tends to distort their decisions. However, here, where uncertainty is
idiosyncratic, trade allows agents to hedge risk through market operations.
More generally, there may be some aspects of the market that tend to reduce
the risk faced by individual agents, and others that would tend to amplify
it. The overall eﬀect cannot be determined on theoretical grounds alone.
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5.4 Diﬀering attitudes towards risk
So far we have assumed that firms are equally risk averse. However, one
can argue that firms may have diﬀerent attitudes towards risk. For example,
the relative importance (in revenue or cost terms) of activities subject to
environmental regulation - and hence the exposure to risk originating from
such regulation - may be greater for some firms than others. More generally,
some (typically larger) firms will be more diversified than other (typically
smaller) firms. Also, some firms have better access to capital markets than
others. Whatever the cause, given that risk attitudes diﬀer one may ask how
such diﬀerences should aﬀect the implementation of environmental policy -
in particular the allocation of quotas and their tradability.
For illustration, let there be two groups of firms; risk neutral and risk
averse. Risk neutral firms will choose investment such that at the margin
investment cost equals the cost of abatement, which, in the tradable quotas
case, equals the price of quotas. That is, we have
f 0(k) = Ep = Ec0(R− E −Kq) (55)
in the tradable quotas case and
f 0(k) = Ec0(ρ− q − k) (56)
when quotas are non-tradable.
The marginal cost of abatement to which firms are exposed diﬀer be-
tween the cases in which quotas are tradable and non-tradable, respectively.
When quotas are tradable firms abate the same amount of pollutants and
hence face the same abatement cost at the margin. When quotas are non-
tradable, however, marginal abatement costs diﬀer as long as investments
(or quota allocations) diﬀer. In particular, consider the case in which shocks
are perfectly correlated and firms are allocated symmetric quotas such that
q = Q = E. Then, since risk averse firms will invest more than risk neutral
firms, they will be exposed both to a lower abatement cost and less risk in
the non-tradable quotas case (when marginal cost is determined by the firm’s
own amount of abatement) than when quotas are tradable (and they face a
common marginal cost determined by average abatement).
To see this, note that under the above conditions the first-order conditions
(39) and (54) for a risk averse firm in the tradable and non-tradable quota
cases, respectively, may be written
E {U 0 (π − c(ρ− q −K) − f(k) + p [k −K]) [p− f 0(k)]} = 0, (57)
E {U 0 (π − c(ρ− q − k)− f(k)) [c0(ρ− q − k)− f 0(k)]} = 0. (58)
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Fixing k, taking the derivative of the left-hand side of (57) with respect to
K and applying the condition p = c0 (ρ− q −K) we find
d2E {U (Πq)}
dKdk
= E {−U 00c00 [k −K] [p− f 0]− U 0c00} . (59)
When k > K, this expression would typically be negative (U and c both
being quadratic is suﬃcient to ensure this). If so,
E {U 0 (π − c(ρ− q −K) − f(k) + p [k −K]) [p− f 0(k)]} (60)
> E {U 0 (π − c(ρ− q − k)− f(k)) [c0(ρ− q − k)− f 0(k)]}
and, assuming the objective function is everywhere concave in k, it follows
that for the risk averse firms kq > kn and aq < an as long as the allocated
quotas are the same. Conversely, for the risk neutral firms we have kq < kn
and aq > an.
Allowing for trade between firms with diﬀerent attitudes towards risk con-
sequently has ambiguous eﬀects on the expected costs of reducing emissions.
On the one hand, trade equalises marginal abatement costs by increasing
abatement in the low-cost (risk averse) firms and reducing abatement in the
high-cost (risk neutral) firms. On the other hand, investment is skewed even
further away from optimum, with less investment being undertaken by the
low-cost (risk neutral) firms and more by the high-cost (risk averse) firms.
If it is known who are, and who are not, risk averse, cost eﬃciency may
be achieved by allocating a suﬃciently large share of quotas to risk averse
firms (assuming that such an allocation is possible within the emission limit)
and allowing for trade.
6 Conclusion
We have shown in this paper how risk aversion and uncertainty can change
the comparison between the commonly considered regulatory instruments of
taxes and quotas. In our model the choice of regulation aﬀects firms’ exposure
to uncertainty. Our omniscient (and benevolent) government can choose to
regulate by taxes and let society at large take on the risk through uncertainty
in environmental outcomes, or regulate by tradable quotas and transfer risk
to firms. Usually an ineﬃciency arises in the latter case which the authority
can counteract in diﬀerent ways, for example by judicious distribution of
initial quotas, separation of pollution target and initial quota allocation and
by acting ex post in the quota market. The proper action depends on each
particular situation. Yet, it is clear that given a certain diﬀerence in eﬃciency
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between taxes and quotas, as in Weitzman (1974) and the literature on ‘prices
vs. quantities’ (that is, whether to regulate by taxes or by quotas), the
introduction of uncertainty and risk aversion will, in general, tilt the balance
in direction of regulation by taxes.12
The policy implications of our analysis are broadly in line with analyses
of other types of marked imperfections. However, there are diﬀerences also,
one of which concerns the importance of the initial allocation of quotas.
Stavins (1995) demonstrates that, in the presence of transaction costs that
vary with volumes of trade, overall costs are at their lowest when quotas
are allocated in such a way that trade is minimised. A similar result is
obtained in cases in which firms have market power, since the incentive to
distort price is proportional to trade volumes (Hahn, 1984). This is not
so in our model. Given the concavity of preferences, firms lose more from a
given purchase than they gain from a correspondingly large sale. Hence, even
when, in expected terms, there is no trade at all optimality is not achieved.
The optimal ex ante allocation is such that trade will indeed take place and,
moreover, the government should itself trade actively in the ex post market.
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